By Anthony Divinagracia

AUGUST 5, 2019 – President Rodrigo Duterte remembered the lady who catapulted him to power on Friday night.

But it was not a commemoration that reflected nostalgia or empathy. It was another memo covered in brute “presidential honesty” as he criticized the late president Corazon Aquino’s land reform program, a day after her tenth death anniversary.

“(Cory) Aquino declared land reform for the entire Philippines but exempted Doña Luisita, her own land. To the many — to those who really wanted to be freed from Marcos, that’s another feeling, maybe of gratitude,” the president said during the Mindanao-wide turnover and distribution of land titles to agrarian reform beneficiaries in Davao City.

“Pero ‘yung — when she said, ‘I would like to declare land reform in all of the Philippines.’ Hindi niya sinali ‘yung kanya. She exempted her… So you [call her?] What? The one who freed, emancipated… It’s incongruity, they call it,” added Duterte, a self-confessed Marcos admirer.

How true is the president’s remark?

Aquino, who appointed Duterte as OIC vice mayor of Davao City after the 1986 People Power Revolution, signed into law Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) on June 10, 1988.

She went on to issue five Executive Orders (EOs) and a Proclamation between 1987 and 1990 to backstop the new land reform measure. Among these were EO 228 which declared full ownership to qualified farmer-beneficiaries covered by former president Ferdinand Marcos’ Presidential Decree 27, and EO 229 which provided the mechanism for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), including stock ownership instead of possessing the actual land titles.

On July 22, 1988, Aquino conveyed her vision to use CARL as a means to alleviate seven million families below the poverty line during her time. She then laid down the specifics of the land distribution program which aimed not to “redistribute poverty” but “increase agricultural productivity, improve rural incomes, and make agriculture the spearhead of economic development.”

“We shall need to acquire and redistribute for Phase One someone million four hundred fifty-four thousand hectares from now until 1992 among nearly eight hundred thousand beneficiaries. With Phase 2, we shall need to redistribute to some 3.7 million beneficiaries about 169,000 hectares in 1988, and over 2.5 million a year from 1989 to 1992,” she said.

Yet Duterte was not the first to see through the alleged pretensions and dishonesty in Aquino’s land reform program.

In a speech on April 1, 1990, former vice president Salvador Laurel vocally questioned Aquino’s accusation that Congress failed the test of emulating the executive department to fully implement agrarian reform.

“She accuses Congress of failing that test. She said moreover that under her administration over 400,000 hectares of land have already been transferred to their tillers. In the process she found it necessary to denigrate the land reform programs of previous administrations as having been ‘piecemeal,’ limited only to rice and corn, and only half-hearted implementation,” he said.

The speech, whose excerpt was posted on the Facebook page of the Salvador H. Laurel Museum and Library on Saturday, also quoted the former vice president’s apparent swipe at Hacienda Luisita, the 6, 453-hectare estate owned by the Cojuangco clan which Aquino belonged.

“The reality belies the rhetoric. The President’s claim is false and deceptive. She did not tell the whole truth. For if the President had told the whole truth, she would have mentioned the fact that a great many of the Certificates of Land Title (CLT) and Emancipation Patents (EP) that have been distributed under her administration were merely recycled from the previous administration under Presidential Decree 27. Most of these pertained to rice and corn lands covered by the Marcos decree,” Laurel exclaimed.

“Paper stock signifying ownership of a third of the registered asset, arbitrarily priced and amortizable for thirty years, and which will be issued instead of land, is not land reform. It is a mockery of land reform – because it will only end up with the small planters losing their lands and the big ones keeping theirs.”

Aquino vs. Marcos?

Under RA 6657, a corporation or land owned by private individuals like Hacienda Luisita can only be acquired or distributed “upon the expiration of the applicable lease, management, grower or service contract in effect as of August 29, 1987, or otherwise, upon its valid termination, whichever comes sooner, but not later than after ten (10) years following the effectivity of the Act.”

Within that period of time, prospective farmer-beneficiaries can enter into profit sharing with the corporations or landlords tilling the land. But transparency was an issue, with the law not obliging the corporation or the landlord to report the total profits earned. The set-up eventually short-changed many farmer-beneficiaries who also had the unenviable task of cultivating the land while their patrons enjoyed the windfall of earnings.

Land title transfers were as problematic, given the Stock Distribution Option (SDO) which the Aquino administration introduced under EO 229 before the CARL was enacted.

Section 10 of EO 229, which complemented CARL stock distribution provisions, states: “Corporate landowners may give their workers and other qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase such proportion of the capital stock of the corporation that the land assets bear in relation to the corporation’s total assets, and grant additional compensation which may be used for this purposes. The approval by the PARC (Presidential Agrarian Reform Council) of a plan for such stock distribution, and its initial implementation, shall be deemed compliance with the land distribution requirements of the CARP.

Cojuangco apologists say that stock distribution was a better option for farmers who lacked the capital to make their lands profitable by producing market-ready crops on a year-long basis. They also cited difficulties to secure loans from the Land Bank or other commercial lenders, which would likely charge higher interest rates and shorter payment periods.  The Cojuangcos likewise justified the practicality of the SDO, noting that farmers would only get 0.79 hectares once the 4,915.75-hectare hacienda was subdivided to 6,296 beneficiaries under the CARP. With a small farm lot to till, farmers are unlikely to reap the fruits of their labor, hence the SDO as a more viable alternative. But the Cojuangco pitch was mere lip service, if not deceptive sales talk.

“Nang maluklok si Cory, natuwa kami. Magigng marangya na raw ang buhay namin dahil magiging stockholders na kami sa programang SDO. Lumipas ang ilang taon, wala naman kaming natikmang magandang buhay. Mas lumiit pa nga ang kita namin. Marami sa amin ang tumatanggap na lang ng hindi hihigit sa P9.50 bawat araw. Pagpapahirap, pagsasamantala ang araw-araw naming nilulunok hanggang sa hindi na namin ito natiis,” recalled farm worker Norma Mabuti in a 2013 fact-finding report by the Unyon ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura (UMA).

Farm workers also protested the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)’s draw lots system which displaced long-time occupants and replaced them with farm-lot owners not originally from the 1989 master list that became the basis of land distribution under the CARL.

“Dahil kasama kami sa masterlist ng DAR nong 1989, nabigyan kami ng home lot. Kampante kami na makakasama sa pinal na listahan ng mga benepisyaryo. Laking gulat na lang namin nang ilabas na nila ang listahan – wala kami rito. Pinagsabihan kami na umalis sa lupang nililinang. Ang tagal na namin dito. Kasama kami sa hirap at pakikibaka pero wala kaming napala sa DAR. Ayaw sana naming umalis pero baka pagod at gastos lang ang aabutin namin. Baka ang nakakuha ng aming lote sa tambyolo ng DAR ang sumunod na magpalayas sa amin. Gulo lang yun. Ngayon heto kami at nakikiani, nagtratrabaho muli bilang manggagawang-bukid sa tubuhan. Ang mga anak ko, naglalabada, sumasama sa konstruksyon, para lang mairaos ang araw-araw,” Mabuti added.

Another farm worker, Leopoldo Datu, Sr. asked: “Ano ba ang basehan ng DAR para ilaglag kami samantalang matagal na kami rito? Benipisyaryo na nga kami ng home lot, e bakit sa farm lot wala kami? Gaya ng napagkaisahan sa organisasyon, at batay na rin sa batas, dapat kung saan nagsasak ay dun na kami italaga. Kaya di ko lilisanin itong .7 ektarya na ito. Hahantong sa gulo kapag may dumating para angkinin ito. Ano’ng karapatan nila? Bakit kasi ito ang ginawang paraan ng DAR na kami ay pag- away-awayin. Ito ba ang reporma sa lupa na sinasabi ng ating gobyerno?”

In the same report, UMA questioned the wisdom of passing the CARL since Aquino could have just followed a 1985 Manila Regional Trial Court (MRTC) decision about the distribution of the Hacienda Luisita property, which the government practically owned after lending lease money to the president’s father Jose Cojuangco, Sr. and his associates at the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO). Prior to securing the loan, Cojuangco, Sr. took control of the Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT) and used it as leverage to obtain loans for the lease of Hacienda Luisita. The government, through the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and the Government Security Insurance System (GSIS) approved Cojuangco, Sr.’s loan in separate resolutions to acquire Hacienda Luisita after the lease contract of the Spaniards ended.

The BSP’s loan approval through Monetary Board Resolution No. 1240 on August 27, 1957, also mandated TADECO to simultaneously purchase Hacienda Luisita and the shares of the CAT, and eventually distribute the vast property to farmer-tenants after ten years under the Magsaysay administration’s social justice program. The late president Ramon Magsaysay intentionally entrusted Hacienda Luisita to the Cojuangco-Aquinos as lessors and stewards, deeming the family as personal friends and political allies. The GSIS approved a P5.9 million loan through Resolution No. 3202 on November 27, 1957, with a similar condition based on Cojuangco’s suggestion.

“It will pave the way for the sale to bonafide planters on a long-term basis portion of the hacienda. This would provide an opportunity for deserving planters to own choice agricultural lands. It will pave the way for the Filipino groups to subdivide the present barrio sites into small lots to be sold on long-term basis to bonafide barrio residents. The purchase therefore would provide an opportunity to for the long-time residents within the hacienda to acquire their homesites,” Cojuangco, Sr. wrote in a letter to GSIS.

But Magsaysay’s handover project was never realized as his family friend Cojuangco, Sr. and TADECO refused to let go of the property for distribution after a ten-year lease. Cojuangco, Sr. in particular argued that the hacienda had no farmer-tenants but only farm-workers. On May 7, 1980, the Marcos administration sued TADECO before the MTRC, demanding the immediate turnover of Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for subdivision and low-cost sale to farmer beneficiaries. The Cojuangco-Aquinos accused the Marcos government of political harassment after losing the case which ordered them to comply with the BSP and GSIS resolutions in the distribution and size at cost of Hacienda Luisita to ‘small farmers’ in line with the (Marcos) administration’s social justice policy. The December 2, 1985 verdict also instructed the Cojuangco-Aquinos to pay the farmers “just compensation fixed at 3,988,000.00 pesos, Philippine currency, with interest at legal rate from the finality of the decision, and costs.”

Supreme Court ruling

The Court of Appeals dismissed the MTRC ruling that favored the Marcos regime after Aquino government appealed the decision. To begin with, the Cojuangco-Aquinos viewed the decision with suspicion, given the Marcos administration’s proclivity for handing out sequestered properties to its cronies, instead of actually distributing Hacienda Luisita to the peasant farmers. Add to that the possibility of entrusting the hacienda to Cory’s cousin , Danding Cojuangco, a known Marcos crony who has been reportedly at odds with the Aquino side of the family since aligning himself with the strongman. The first Aquino president also had a penchant for erasing traces of the Marcos regime, including the Manila Trail Court decision that may spell the outright dispossession of the Cojuangco-Aquino’s crown jewel at the heart of their political bailiwick in Tarlac.

But sans the Marcos legal obstacle, Aquino then proceeded to outline her own land reform program which culminated with the enactment of the CARL. A month after the CARL was passed, TADECO formed the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) to implement the SDO. On May 9, 1989, farm workers were asked in a referendum to choose between stocks or land. The stock option won by a 92.90 percent vote. The second referendum practically yielded the same result but with a bigger 96.75 percent turnout. Some critics however disputed the credibility of the referendum, with reports that the farmers were either sweet-talked anew or coerced at gun-point to choose the SDO. Despite this arrangement, the Cojuangcos still controlled 67 percent of the HLI’s shares to only 33 percent with the farmers.

Aquino’s term ended with majority of Luisita farmer still landless and impoverished, negating her vision to uplift the lives of the peasant tillers through a genuine agrarian reform program that was virtually hijacked by the dubious SDO scheme of the Cojuangco-controlled TADECO. Four more administrations witnessed the back-and-forth of negotiations between the Cojuangcos and the farm workers in a span of two decades.

On November 16, 2004, at least seven were killed and 121 were injured in a violent protest dispersal called the “Hacienda Luisita massacre.” After the incident, the Arroyo administration, upon recommendation from the Task Force Luisita, revoked the SDO agreement in May 1989 and ordered the distribution of the land through the PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 on December 5, 2005. The HLI then asked the Supreme Court to issue a temporary restraining order against the PARC resolution. The High Court conducted oral arguments on the Hacienda Luisita case.

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court unanimously voted 14-0 to uphold Arroyo’s PARC resolution to revoke the SDO and distribute the property in question. The landmark decision also directed the DAR to conduct another referendum, saying the farmers have the right to remain as stockholders or receive the actual land, despite the voiding of the SDO scheme.

“In line with our finding that control over agricultural lands must always be in the hands of the farmers, We reconsider our ruling that the qualified FWBs (farmer worker beneficiaries) should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI,” the Supreme Court said.

“A revisit of HLI’s Proposal for Stock Distribution under CARP and the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) upon which the proposal was based reveals that the total assets of HLI are PhP 590,554,220, while the value of the 4,915.7466 hectares is PhP 196,630,000.  Consequently, the share of the farmer-beneficiaries in the HLI capital stock is 33.296% (196,630,000 divided by 590,554.220); 118,391,976.85 HLI shares represent 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of the 118,391,976.85 HLI shares unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be placed in the hands of the farmer-beneficiaries.  Control, of course, means the majority of 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares,” the ruling added.

Curiously, Arroyo who issued the PARC order to distribute Hacienda Luisita was put on hospital arrest for plunder charges under the presidency of Aquino’s son Noynoy. Arroyo’s midnight appointee, former Chief Justice Renato Corona was impeached and convicted by the Senate in 2012 for failing to disclose vital information in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth. Corona’s camp believed the ouster, engineered by Aquino himself, stemmed from his vote to have the hacienda lands partitioned and distributed to the farmers.

In a May 3, 2017 resolution, the High Court directed DAR and the farmers’ union Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Hacienda Luisita (Ambala) to explain why it should not be held in contempt for stalling the implementation of its 2011 ruling on the distribution of the hacienda to 6,296 farmer-beneficiaries. But on November 28, 2017, the High Court granted a CAT petition exempting 424 hectares of the hacienda from agrarian reform coverage after it was reclassified as agro-industrial zones before the CARL was enacted June 15, 1988.

Yet despite the hiccups, the Duterte administration has expedited its land reform policy, granting 120,889 of 613,327 hectares programmed for distribution since the former Davao City mayor assumed office. Overall, the government has given 4.72 million hectares to 2.79 million farmer beneficiaries under the Land Acquisition and Distribution program, from 1972 to 2016.

Aquino’s land reform program may have been imperfect, if not self-serving, that it chose not to heed the suffering of the peasant farmers, as Duterte had noted. But the governments after Cory are as equally responsible, if not liable. So far, the Marcos-admiring mayor that Cory catapulted to power more than three decades ago is not exempting himself from the responsibility.

Anthony Divinagracia is a senior producer of News 5 and One News. He teaches at the Department of Political Science of the University of Santo Tomas.