By Manny Mogato
(October 27, 2024) – In June 2018, Kenneth Paul Albotra got an urgent transfer order from his superiors to report to the Police Regional Office in the Southern Tagalog in Camp Vicente Lim in Laguna.
A graduate of the Philippine National Police Academy (PNPA) class of 2006, Albotra was assigned to several places in the last 18 years of his police service. However, lawmakers looking into thousands of extrajudicial killings under former president Rodrigo Duterte were puzzled over Alborta’s assignments for a short period.
For instance, he was ordered to transfer from Police Station 1 in Cebu City to Laguna as an intelligence officer in Calamba.
The assignment lasted only for 26 days.
Albotra claimed his transfer order was canceled, so he was back in Cebu in the first week of July. Two of his subordinates who joined him in Laguna were also ordered to return to Region 7.
Albotra’s 26-day transfer order was not unusual. He also stayed only four months in Dumaguete City and another central Visayan city.
Antipolo Rep. Romeo Acop, a seasoned police investigator who had commanded the Police Criminal Investigation Service in the late 1980s, could not help but wonder why Albotra had a pattern of being assigned in an area for a short period.
He believed it had a purpose. He could be on a special mission for a particular project.
In July 2018, when he was conveniently back in Cebu, Tanuan Mayor Antonio Haiili was shot dead by a sniper more than 500 meters away while at a flag ceremony.
Since Halili’s killing was still fresh, Albotra had boasted to his boss, Lt. Col. Royina Garma, that he was part of the team that assassinated Halili.
Albotra had all the intentions to inform Garma about his “accomplishment.” He could get a promotion and a juicy assignment if he would be in Garma’s good graces.
She was, after all, close to regional police chief Gen. Debold Sinas, who later rose as PNP chief, and to Duterte, the chief architect of the war on drugs policy.
Garma remembered Alborta’s story, which was shared with her in confidence.
Testifying at the quad committee at the lower house, Albotra denied Garma’s statement and the killing of Halili as well.
He has a plausible excuse. He was already back in Cebu when the mayor was killed.
However, days before the killing, Albotra could have had some role in casing and putting surveillance on the mayor.
In fact, there was CCTV footage of what appeared to be Albotra in a convenience store days before Halili was killed.
Two years later, another CCTV image showed a man resembling Albotra outside a convenience store in Los Baños, Laguna.
Days later, Mayor Caesar Perez was gunned down near the municipal building in Los Baños.
There were suspicions that Albotra’s team was used to conduct surveillance and to pick the place where a gunman could fire at the target.
Thus, Albotra can claim he was not involved in the killing since he was no longer there. But he could not deny that he had a role in the assassination of the local officials.
One of his subordinates, PO3 Eugene Calumpa, had died in a shootout while on a surveillance mission to assassinate Jessielou Cadungog, a Tejero, Cebu councilor in July 2018.
Calumpa’s death could only confirm that Albotra’s team specialized in surveillance of targets for assassination. Another team takes over for the hit.
That could also explain why Albotra had an erratic pattern of assignments, which lasted only days to months.
Little by little, the quad committee had been exposing the mechanics of Duterte’s brutal and bloody war on drugs.
From the drug watch lists drawn by the barangay anti-illegal drug councils to an order of battle carefully validated by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Duterte has amassed more than 6,000 names.
The list actually grew as authorities inserted names to justify the assassination, like Wesley Barayuga.
Rewards were offered for the deaths of people on the list. Assassins were rewarded P20,000 for the elimination of ordinary drug peddlers, couriers, and users.
Up to P1 million were given for the death of high-profile personalities and local politicians.
A secret police group led by Col. Edilberto Leonardo ran the target and reward lists, and trusted police officers—from PNPA classes of 1996, 1997, and 1998—were assigned to the different areas to carry out the drug war.
They even paid a courtesy call to Duterte a few days before he was sworn in as president at his office inside the Department of Public Works and Highways compound in Panacan, where Leonardo had initially presented his drug war mechanism.
Leonardo claimed the plan did not push through, although Garma had testified that funds continued to pour into Leonardo’s office from Malacañang to reward police accomplishments.
Col. Marvin Marcos, a classmate of Leonardo, was in Tacloban to neutralize Albuera Mayor Rolando Espinosa.
Col. Lito Patay, a classmate of Garma, was in Station 6 in Quezon City, where 108 people died from July 2016 to June 2017, about 38% of 280 killings in the whole of Quezon City during the same period.
Gerard Bantag, another classmate of Garma, cleaned up drug lords at the New Bilibid Prison.
Col. Hector Grijaldo was Mandaluyong Police chief to help cover up Barayuga’s killing in July 2020, the same month that Halili was killed.
Incidentally, Lt. Col. Santie Mendoza admitted involvement in the Barayuga killing. He is a classmate of Albotra in the PNPA.
All these police officers were linked by class affiliations, personal friendships, and assignments in the same units.
All have links to Davao or personalities like Garma, Espinosa, Sinas, and former PNP chief Bato Dela Rosa.
The quad committee has not unearthed the extent of the PNP in Duterte’s drug war. It had barely scratched the surface.
As the lower house inquiry progresses, more shocking revelations will be uncovered.
But Garma and Leonardo must tell all.
The views expressed by the columnist do not necessarily reflect that of the media organization.
